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EUROPE AND THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN
COUNTRIES (SMCs: Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia,
and Morocco) share a long history of economic
and political relations. Up until the early middle
ages, the Mediterranean served to ease the
exchange of information, people, and goods
between Europe and distant countries. This
resulted in strong political and economic ties
between Europe and the SMCs (Braudel et al,
1977). However, in modern times the
Mediterranean seems to have turned into a natural
barrier between the divergent economic and
political developments on the northern and
southern shores. And initiatives for strengthening
the linkages (such as the Union for the
Mediterranean) have delivered little. One bold
proposal for overcoming the Mediterranean barrier
has been the development of a Euro-
Mediterranean Economic Area by 2030 as called
by the Bruegel Policy Contribution Eastern-
European Lessons for the Southern Mediterranean.
The proposal outlined how domestic reforms in the
southern Mediterranean could be encouraged by
(1) providing much needed short term assistance,
(2) a mid-term quid-pro-quo framework that links
successful reforms in the SMCs to a stepwise
opening of the European labour and product
market and that (3) anchoring the reforms to a
shared long-term goal (a joint economic area by
2030). Moving towards such a vision requires a
better understanding of the economic linkages
between Europe and the SMCs.
Due to its size (500 million inhabitants) and
economic power (GDP €12 trillion), Europe is a
natural gravitational centre for the countries of the
southern shore. Several studies analyse the
economic relationship of the EU or individual
countries to the SMCs. However, neither Europe
nor the SMCs are homogenous blocs. Based on
geographical proximity, common history and
language some European Mediterranean countries
are significantly more bonded to the SMCs than
others. In this Policy Contribution, we quantify the
degree of integration between key European
countries and the five SMCs (in terms of trade,
investment flows, financial flows, migration, and
aid). The aim is to identify key-patterns of
interaction. For this purpose we conduct a
comparative analysis by putting the economic
relationship between the SMCs and European
countries in the context of their economic size and
their geographical distance. This allows us to
identify which countries have disproportionally
strong economic ties.
1 MEASURING THE MEDITERRANEAN
We examine the relationship between geographic
proximity and economic proximity. Although
geographical distance is easy to measure,
economic distance is less straightforward. We
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Figure 1: Relative geographical distances
between the population centres of the selected
countries (normalised to 0-100)
Source: CEPII GeoDist Database (the distance between the
population centres of Egypt and the UK (3600 km) is set to
100). Note: for better readability, the US has been excluded.
employ an approach based on economic ‘gravity
models’ to discern the relative economic distance
between nations (see Box 1). Specifically, we
measure and study the economic distances
between the SMCs and the five biggest EU
economies.
The relative geographical distance in Figure 1 may
be used as a reference for comparison of the
geographical distances with economic distances
calculated in the following sections. Obviously, the
UK and Germany are further away from any SMC
than France, Italy or Spain, though the distance
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between northern Europe and the SMCs is less
than the distance between some of the SMCs
themselves. One would expect that the three
southern EU Mediterranean countries would
interact economically more with the SMCs.
1.1 Trade
The gravity model literature generally agrees that
the trade flows into and out of the MENA (Middle
East and North Africa) region are unexpectedly
low. Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000), for example,
found that the countries of this region are scarcely
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BOX 1: METHODOLOGY
In trade economics, gravity models have been used to predict bilateral trade flows (Fij) based on
the ‘masses’ of the trading economies (Mi and Mj) and the geographical distance (Dij) between
them:
In these models, GDP is traditionally used as the measure of economic mass. We invert the idea of
the gravity model to calculate a relative measure of the pairwise distance between countries.
Rearranging the gravity model formula and solving proximity (the inverse of the distance), we obtain:
Our aim is to calculate the ‘proximity’ for different categories of exchanges between countries. We will
calculate it for aid, migration, exports, imports, total trade, FDI, and foreign claims. As these are very
different categories, it does not appear sensible to take GDP as the measure of ‘mass’. Hence, we
use the exchange with all countries in the corresponding category to measure the economic ‘mass’.
The formula then becomes, for two countries i and j, the following:
For example, the measure of export distance between Algeria and France would be measured in the
following way:
To represent the data, the distances for each indicator are normalised to 0-100:
The following data was used for the analysis: migration data (2010 migrant stocks estimates) were gathered from Ratha
and Shaw (2007) updated with additional data for 71 destination countries as described in the World Bank Migration and
Remittances Factbook 2011; trade data was gathered from the UN Comtrade database; aid and FDI data was gathered from
the OECD Stat database; claims data was obtained from the BIS Quarterly Review, September 2011. Where available, data
for the five SMCs (Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco), the five biggest EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
UK) and the USA was used.
Flow or Stock
Mass
D
P
max P
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1. Spanish FDI data for
Tunisia was missing.
integrated with the rest of the world, and only
integrated with each other. In addition, Iqbal and
Nabli (2007) showed that SMC non-oil trade flows
are just one third of what could be reasonably
expected based on the MENA region’s per-capita
incomes, natural endowments and populations. In
this section, we analyse the SMCs’ bilateral trade
flows by relating them to the total trade of their
partners (see Box 1). Hence, a country that trades
little with an SMC appears quite distant from this
SMC, while a country that conducts a higher share
of its trade with an SMC appears closer. To make
the figures comparable among SMCs, we control
for the total trade of the individual SMC. The results
of this simple exercise are striking.
Measuring relative distance through bilateral trade
works surprisingly well for all countries. The
ordering of ‘distances’ calculated from trade data
is largely consistent with geographic distances.
Algeria is closest to Tunisia (and vice versa), and
Morocco is closest to Spain, Tunisia and Algeria.
The UK, USA, and Germany are much more distant
from the SMCs than the three EU Mediterranean
countries (France, Italy and Spain). This indicates
that the trade patterns of the SMCs are not
substantially biased towards trade with their SMC
neighbours compared to trade with EU countries.
Hence, intra-SMC trade barriers seem to be of
similar size to trade barriers with European
partners. The Mediterranean does not seem to be
an extra barrier to trade.
When looking at the figures in detail, some
particular cases emerge: (1) of all five SMCs,
Egypt is the most distant from the partners
analysed. It trades substantially less than the
other countries with Morocco and Tunisia, its close
neighbours. There are two explanations: first
Egypt trades more with countries not studied in
Figure 1 (eg India and the eastern Mediterranean
countries), and second, Egypt is, in general, a
rather isolated economy. (2) Trade between
France and Tunisia is greater than the geographic
distance would suggest. This can be explained by
the non-geographic proximity of the countries, ie
history, language and migration.
1.2 Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has developed
differently in different SMCs over the past decade.
While Morocco has increased its share of EU FDI,
from about 6 percent of GDP in 2000 to about 16
percent of GDP in 2009, the share of European FDI
going to Libya, Tunisia and Algeria has remained
low and constant relative to GDP (6 percent, 6
percent and 2 percent). To the sources of FDI we
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Trade with the 5 EU countries/SMCs/US as % country’s total trade
56% 34% 52% 67%
Total trade (US$ millions)
98,051 79,335 51,144 38,642
Morocco Spain Tunisia UK US
Figure 2: Distance according to total trade 2010
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade database (UN Sta-
tistics Division, 2011).
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Share of FDI contributed by the five EU countries and the US
78% 81% 78% 94% 90%
Total FDI position (US$ millions)
11,183 33,041 3,752 18,604 3,062
France Germany Italy
Spain UK US
Figure 3: Distance according to FDI position 2009
Source: Bruegel based on OECD.Stat FDI position data
(OECD, 2011).
05
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
percentage retained by US banks is 6.8 percent at
most (Egypt).
French banks by far hold the most claims in the
SMCs. In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, French
banks are the major holders of external claims.
Alongside the strong French exposure, only the
role of Italian banks in Egypt is worth mentioning.
All other countries (UK, US, Germany and Spain)
are underrepresented relative to the size of their
foreign financial sector claims.
1.4 GDP Synchronisation
Highly integrated economies have positively
correlated business cycles (Backus et al, 1992).
However, the correlation of the level of economic
activity in two countries can also be because the
GDPs of both countries respond to the same
factors (eg oil price or global demand). However,
the absence of business-cycle correlation can
demonstrate that two countries are not closely
integrated economically. Correlation of business
cycles is a practical, but by no means perfect,
indicator for general economic integration.
Applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to quarterly
GDP data, we extract the business cycles for the
employ the same methodology as used with trade
to calculate a measure of distance between the
SMCs and their partner countries (see Box 1).
Our main finding is that geographical distance is
less good a predictor for FDI than it is for trade.
Still, the closest countries (Italy, France and, to a
lesser degree, Spain) are more active in the SMCs
than the distant countries (UK, US and Germany).
Some interesting cases emerge: (1) France is one
of the top two sources of FDI for all five SMCs. This
predominant role is probably not merely the result
of the French political interest in the region, but
also partly a reason for it. (2) Italy has invested
relatively more than France in Tunisia, Algeria and
Egypt. This exposure will also have an influence
on Italian political interest in the SMCs. In Libya,
Italy is less involved than one would expect from
historic and geographic ties. (3) Spain has some
exposure in Libya and Morocco1. (4) The UK, US
and Germany are not exposed to the region.
Germany is even less active in Algeria and Egypt
than the much more geographically remote US. 
1.3 Financial flows
Banks in the SMCs are open to international finan-
cial flows to very different degrees. Egypt and
Morocco are similar in that their banking sectors
are more open, even if the reasons for their open-
ness differ. The liberalisation and privatisation
actions undertaken by Egypt were aimed at
improving the GDP contribution of the financial
sector (IMF, 2010); in Morocco, these policies
have been implemented as part of a framework for
the opening of the whole economy. Tunisia’s three
largest state-owned banks still account for about
half of the market. Hence in terms of banking-
sector openness Tunisia lies somewhere between
Morocco/Egypt and Algeria/Libya. The banking
sectors in Libya and Algeria are still tightly closed
to foreign participation.
Despite differences in the openness of their
financial sectors, almost all foreign money flowing
into the financial sectors of all five SMCs comes
from Europe. The percentage of foreign claims held
by European banks is lowest in Algeria (74
percent) and highest in Libya (99 percent). US
banks hold a significant proportion of foreign
claims only in Algeria; in the other countries, the
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Share of banking claims held by the five EU countries and the US
96% 92% 80% 97% 95%
Total claims (US$ millions)
8,154 39,385 476 26,056 7,293
France Germany Italy
Spain UK US
Figure 4: Distance according to foreign claims
on the SMCs (March 2011)
Source: Bruegel based on BIS Quarterly Review, September
20112.
2. The graphs represent the
breakdown of consolidated
foreign claims on individual
countries on an ultimate
risk basis by nationality of
reporting banks. The total
corresponds to the total of
the 24 source countries’
financial claims reported by
the BIS.
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SMCs for which quarterly GDP data were available
(Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia) – see Figure 4. We
then analyse the correlation of the cyclical
components of the individual countries’ GDPs.
The first finding is that business cycles in the
developed countries are highly correlated. In con-
trast, the business cycles of Egypt, Morocco and
Tunisia are not correlated. This supports the view
that the SMCs are economically not integrated.
The second finding is that the business cycle of
Tunisia happened to be highly correlated with that
of all developed countries between 2002 and
2009. Whether this is due to the ‘small country
effect’, which left Tunisia more exposed to the
global business cycle than Morocco or Egypt, or
whether it was due to deeper integration with
developed economies, cannot be deduced from
the correlation figures alone. The great importance
of highly weather-sensitive agriculture in the GDP
of Morocco and Egypt might be responsible for the
low correlation of the two countries’ GDP with
those of the developed countries.
The third interesting result is that the business
cycle of Morocco is weakly (at the 10 percent
significance level) correlated with the French and
Italian business cycles, while it is not correlated
with the business cycle of any other sampled EU
country. This again highlights the important role
France and Italy play in the region.
Finally, we note that the Egyptian business cycle
we extracted from the GDP figures is unusually
volatile. This might again be due to the high
weather-sensitivity of the Egyptian economy. Sur-
prisingly, the Egyptian business cycle is corre-
lated to the German one at the 5 percent
significance level.
1.5 Migration
The European Union is the preferred destination
for migrants from all SMCs. However, the numbers
and preferences differ significantly between
countries.
Calculating distances, using migration data,
confirms that France is clearly the most attractive
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Figure 5: GDP cycle component of the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics for Egypt,
Morocco and Tunisia; Eurostat for France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, United Kingdom and United States.
Table 1: Pairwise correlation of business cycles
Egypt Morocco Tunisia France Germany Italy Spain UK USA
Egypt 1
Morocco -0.029 1
Tunisia 0.275 -0.143 1
France 0.177 0.337* 0.530*** 1
Germany 0.418** 0.27 0.618*** 0.907*** 1
Italy 0.198 0.300* 0.536*** 0.982*** 0.935*** 1
Spain 0.148 0.223 0.486*** 0.942*** 0.873*** 0.954*** 1
UK 0.102 0.212 0.562*** 0.896*** 0.806*** 0.902*** 0.899*** 1
USA 0.071 0.353** 0.437** 0.901*** 0.904*** 0.927*** 0.923*** 0.758*** 1
Source: Bruegel. Note: Business cycles fluctuations have been obtained applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to seasonally
adjusted real quarterly GDP data. Data for Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have been seasonally adjusted thanks to the E-
views’  X11 procedure. The number of “*”next to a coefficient indicates the level of significance of the pairwise correlation
(* for 10 percent, ** for 5 percent, and *** for 1 percent).
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1.6 Aid flows
Between 2003 and 2010, the five European
countries disbursed about $9 billion in official
development aid (ODA) to the SMCs. This
corresponds to 4 percent of their total official
development aid. The US spent $3 billion or 2
percent. The distribution of aid by source country
somewhat mirrors the trade, investment, financial
and migration exposures. France is the main
donor (relative to its total aid) in all SMCs except
Egypt. It spends 9 percent of its overall aid in the
region. Spain is active in the western SMCs
(Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), while, in terms of
financial, investment, migration and trade flows, it
is mainly exposed only to Morocco.
In contrast to the EU Mediterranean countries, the
US, the UK and Germany play no role in the west-
ern SMCs. The US and Germany provide significant
ODA, relative to their overall foreign aid portfolios,
only to Egypt and Libya. According to these fig-
ures, the UK is virtually absent in the region.
In terms of ODA, in addition to the five EU countries
covered by this Policy Contribution, the European
institutions are a sixth major partner. EU
institutions are among the top-two donors in
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The EU spent
destination for emigrants from Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia. Obviously, history plays a more
important role for migration than geographic
distance. Present migration is potentially
amplified by long-lasting path-dependencies of
migration patterns. This is particularly striking in
the case of Algeria, which has slightly closer trade
and investment links with France than one would
expect from their geographic distance, but which
has a migration pattern that is extremely focused
on France (Algeria was formerly part of France).
Egyptian migration is very different from those of
the western SMCs. More than three quarters of
Egyptian migrants go to the Gulf countries (42
percent to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates and Qatar), Jordan (23 percent) and
Libya (11 percent). Finally, there is only limited
emigration from Libya to all countries.
Although less important, geography also plays a
role. Italy is a major destination for Moroccans and
Tunisians, while Spain is a major destination for
Moroccans. Emigration of people from the SMCs to
the US, the UK and Germany is negligible relative
to the number of immigrants in these countries.
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Total migrants (thousands)
1,211 3,741 110 3,017 652
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Figure 6: Distance according to migration
stocks, 2010
Source: Bruegel based on Ratha and Shaw (2007) updated
with additional data for 71 destination countries as
described in the World Bank Migration and Remittances
Factbook 2011.
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Share of ODA contributed by the 5 EU countries and the US
73% 64% 78% 45% 60%
Total ODA (US$ millions)
2,140 7,956 204 7,201 2,896
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Spain UK US
Figure 7: Distance according to sum of ODA
received 2003-10 from all OECD countries
Source: Bruegel based on OECD.Stat aid data (OECD, 2011).
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3. The ‘five-plus-five dia-
logue’ was a cooperation
process in the western
Mediterranean that involved
Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria,
Mauritania, Libya, France,
Portugal, Spain, Italy and
Malta.
4. The Mediterranean Forum
was a framework for cooper-
ation between Portugal,
Spain, France, Italy, Greece,
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
Egypt, Malta and Turkey.
$5 billion between 2003 and 2010, or 6 percent of
its aid budget.
2 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This Policy Contribution shows using up-to-date
data that France, Italy, and Spain have a particular
economic interest in the south-west Mediter-
ranean. Furthermore, in terms of investment,
trade, and financial and migration flows, they are
‘closer’ to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia than geo-
graphic proximity alone would suggest. The flip-
side of this special relationship is that other
countries – such as Germany and the UK – are rel-
atively more ‘distant’ from the SMCs in economic
terms. Hence, it is not the EU as a whole that has
a special relationship with the south-west
Mediterranean, but three countries that are par-
ticularly active in the region.
The existence of this special economic relationship
has political implications. As we have shown,
France and Spain are disproportionally active in the
region in terms of bilateral development assis-
tance, a proxy for political attention paid to a region.
Beyond bilateral political links, the SMCs’
relationships with the EU as a whole are shaped
by the special relationship between the western
Mediterranean countries. European foreign policy
is still largely defined by its member states and
their interests. The war in Libya – in which France
was a driving force while Germany abstained –
clearly illustrated that the foreign policy interest
of different EU member states do not necessarily
overlap. In the past the EU’s relationship towards
the SMCs was largely driven by European-
Mediterranean countries. Early cooperation
forums such as the ‘five-plus-five dialogue’3 or the
Mediterranean Forum4 did not involve northern
European countries. In 2008, the Mediterranean
Union proposed by French President Sarkozy,
which was supposed to create a joint governance
structure for all Mediterranean countries, was
supported by Italy, Spain and Greece. Due to
pressure from the EU and some member states
(namely Germany) it was, however, transferred
into Union for the Mediterranean that includes the
entire European Union. The advantage of this
special relationship for the SMCs is that they have
three important advocates in the EU that, in total,
represent one third of the population and 37
percent of EU GDP. This has certainly influenced
the focus that EU institutions put on the region. EU
institutions spend 50 percent more on the region
per capita than on other developing countries.
On the other hand, this special relationship poses
a risk. The concentration of FDI, external trade and
external finance on a limited number of partners is
a risky strategy because it makes these flows par-
tially conditional on the economic wellbeing of a
limited number of partner countries. Additionally,
in times when the economic weight of the EU
Mediterranean countries in the EU is challenged
by the European crisis and continuing eastward
enlargement, the strong focus of the south-west
Mediterranean countries on the northern shore of
the Mediterranean might also have political con-
sequences. Hence, diversifying investment in the
SMCs, and financial and trade flows, to cover non-
traditional European partners could be a good
strategy for strengthening the relationships
between the SMCs and the EU, and making the ties
more resilient. While in relative terms this would
involve a reduction in the importance of individual
EU partners, in absolute terms the link between all
partners might be strengthened.
All three sides – the EU Mediterranean countries,
the EU non-Mediterranean countries and the SMCs
– could gain from such a rebalancing of the eco-
nomic relationship. But, to make this happen, all
three sides would have to move. The EU Mediter-
ranean countries would have to support their
northern EU partners in becoming active in the
region, for example by surrendering some of their
privileged access. The non-Mediterranean EU
countries would have to increase their economic
exposure in the SMCs, for example through invest-
ment and trade promotion and by enabling some
circular migration. And, finally, the SMCs should
encourage economic activity on the part  of non-
traditional partners by lowering barriers for all
partners, for example by making regulatory and
decision-making processes more transparent.
A strategic balancing of the economic relationship
could make the economic and political relation-
ships between the EU and individual SMCs more
predictable and resilient, which will be to the ben-
efit of all partners.
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